aliwoto_dev
Do It by Code⚠️ Indian telecom Reliance is sabotaging access to Telegram for millions of users OUTSIDE India (including the UAE) via a rogue method called BGP hijacking.
🧨 The sabotage seems intentional, as Reliance has ignored multiple reports.
😞 This may be part of a competitive war, as Reliance is partiallmy friend's Codex (gpt5.5) investigation results about it:
Short version: you’re not missing the longest-prefix rule. 2a0a:f280:203::/48 from Telegram AS211157 should beat Reliance’s 2a0a:f280::/32 for addresses inside that /48. So the IPv6 /32 alone does not hijack that specific /48 where the /48 is visible.
But there is still a real incident-looking pattern:
- 2a0a:f280::/32 is Telegram-allocated space under 2a0a:f280::/29, but bgp.tools and RIPE looking-glass currently see it originated by AS18101.
- RIPE looking-glass saw 189 peer routes for that IPv6 /32, all origin AS18101, across 22 RRCs, including Dubai/UAE. First observed update in that sample was around 2026-06-16 16:46 UTC.
- The only more-specific inside that /32 shown by bgp.tools is 2a0a:f280:203::/48, which is validly originated by Telegram AS211157 and seen by 346 peer routes.
- IPv6 RPKI for AS18101 announcing 2a0a:f280::/32 is unknown, not invalid, because Telegram has a ROA for only 2a0a:f280:203::/48, not a covering /32`/`/29 ROA.
The stronger smoking gun is IPv4: 91.108.56.0/22.
- That block is Telegram Messenger Network.
- Legit origin is AS62041; RPKI validates AS62041 for 91.108.56.0/22.
- RIPEstat also sees AS18101 originating the exact same /22.
- RPKI for AS18101 on 91.108.56.0/22 is invalid_asn.
- RIPE looking-glass saw 13 AS18101 routes for that IPv4 /22 and 328 legitimate AS62041 routes. Since this is same prefix length, AS18101 can win on networks preferring that path/localpref.
- bgp.tools also shows 91.108.56.0/22 with multiple originators: AS62041, AS18101, and AS9829.
So my read:
This is a real unauthorized-origin/leak/hijack situation. The public claim is overstated if it implies the IPv6 /32 overrides Telegram’s /48; it doesn’t, under normal BGP longest-prefix routing. But the IPv6 /32 can still blackhole/steal any Telegram addresses in that /32 not covered by the /48, and the IPv4 91.108.56.0/22 issue is more directly harmful because AS18101 competes at the same prefix le… Read in full →
Do It by CodeThe Qt Company just released official Rust bindings for Qt. 🦀
qtbridge-rust lets you write Qt Quick (QML) UIs with a pure Rust backend, no C++ required.
What this means:
→ QObject, signals, slots, and properties via Rust attribute macros
→ Built on CXX : safe Rust/C++ interop under the hood
→ Toki
Finally a valid reason to "Learn Rust".
A aliwoto_devtho if your goal is purely qt, it has lots of other language bindings as well https://wiki.qt.io/Language_Bindings
Do It by Codepeople out there are doing some weird shit with LLMs
someone put Minecraft + Black Ops mode in Elden Ring
source
What the fuck did I just watched? 💀💀💀
I'm so damn lost
💯1
Do It by CodeAn XSS payload, Cuneiform-alphabet based. Bypass WAF
𒀀='',𒉺=!𒀀+𒀀,𒀃=!𒉺+𒀀,𒇺=𒀀+{},𒌐=𒉺[𒀀++],
𒀟=𒉺[𒈫=𒀀],𒀆=++𒈫+𒀀,𒁹=𒇺[𒈫+𒀆],𒉺[𒁹+=𒇺[𒀀]
+(𒉺.𒀃+𒇺)[𒀀]+𒀃[𒀆]+𒌐+𒀟+𒉺[𒈫]+𒁹+𒌐+𒇺[𒀀]
+𒀟][𒁹](𒀃[𒀀]+𒀃[𒈫]+𒉺[𒀆]+𒀟+𒌐+"(𒀀)")()
#bugbountytips #bugbountytip
Posted by 𝐤𝐣𝐮𝐥𝐢𝐮𝐬, 1 day ago
How on earth they ended up discovering THIS? 🐔
Do It by CodeDeepSeek V4.1F-1017 has built this in like 5 minutes.
(Since then it's autistically rabbitholing into minor details)
These are unambiguously better than Opus's.
It's a good deal stronger than V4.1.
Posted by Teortaxes▶️ (DeepSeek 推特🐋铁粉 2023 – ∞), 3 hour ago
DeepSeek-v4.1-Flash-1017 on huggingface
بجمام
Do It by Codetwo 0day/0click RCE vulnerabilities in PHP
CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
details will be published in 14:00 UTC today (in 9 hours)
links:
- php archive
- php announcement
- watchTowr
note: this is not just about wordpress, all tools/platforms relying on php may be affected
multiple PH
any exploits shared anywhere? that's a true bomb